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Abstract—Automatic emergency steering maneuvers can be
used to avoid more obstacles than emergency braking alone.
While a steer-by-wire system can decouple the driver who would
essentially act as a disturbance during the emergency steering
maneuver, the alternative in which the steering wheel remains
coupled would enable the driver to cover for automation faults
and conform to regulations that require the driver to retain
control authority. In this paper we present results from a driving
simulator study with 48 participants in which we tested the
performance of three emergency steering intervention schemes.
We analyzed cases in which the driver was decoupled and the
automation given full authority, or the driver was coupled and the
automation given a low impedance, or the driver was coupled and
the automation given a high impedance. Two types of unexpected
automation faults were also simulated. Results showed that a
high impedance automation system results in significantly fewer
collisions during intended steering interventions but significantly
higher collisions during automation faults when compared to
a low impedance automation system. Moreover, decoupling the
driver in emergency interventions did not seem to significantly
increase the time required to hand back control to the driver.
When coupled, drivers were able to cover for a faulty automation
system and avoid obstacles to a certain degree, though differences
by condition were significant for only one type of automation
fault.
Index Terms—automatic steering intervention, intelligent
transportation systems, automation impedance, human factors
I. INTRODUCTION
Progress in the development of vehicle automation and
advanced driver assist systems has made driving more efficient,
comfortable, and safe [1], [2]. To date, most vehicle automa-
tion is aimed at offloading certain routine tasks from the
human driver in non-emergency situations [3]. Yet automation
can also mitigate or avoid accidents in emergency situations,
where fast reaction times and the ability to push control up
to vehicle traction limits enable automation to outperform
the human driver [4]–[6]. An example is emergency collision
avoidance that uses automatic braking to prevent or mitigate
a collision [7], [8]. Above a certain speed and below a certain
time-to-collision (shorter than about two seconds), steering
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maneuvers can result in more successful collision avoidance
than braking [4], [5], [9]. However, unlike automatic braking
systems, automatic steering intervention systems are not yet
available on the road [4], [8], [10]. Accordingly, development
of automatic steering intervention systems has attracted sig-
nificant interest in the recent past [4], [5], [8], [10], [11].
To take over control during an emergency situation, the
steering wheel can be decoupled from the driver with the
use of a steer-by-wire-system [4], [12]. However, decoupling
the driver invokes liability issues, especially when there is
a false activation of the automation system. A decoupled
steering wheel during a false activation might render the driver
incapable of avoiding a collision that could be prevented [4],
[11]. Further, the present legal system and code of industrial
practice, as well as the principles of human-centered design,
dictate that a driver should always maintain some degree of
control over the vehicle [2], [13], [14].
The issues with decoupling the driver are compounded
during automation dropouts (when the automation system fails
to detect and avoid an obstacle). The literature provides ample
evidence that highly automated systems may reduce driver
vigilance and situation awareness due to a lack of sufficient
involvement of the driver in the driving task and lack of
timely feedback of automation actions [15]–[17]. A driver
who expects that they are decoupled from the steering system
during emergency situations might become over-reliant on
the automation and might fail to prevent a collision during
automation dropouts [1], [2]. Moreover, the time required for
the driver to resume control of the vehicle may also increase,
leading to additional safety issues [10].
The alternative is to keep the driver coupled and use an
automation system that intervenes through a motor on the
steering system. However, with a coupled steering wheel, the
steering torque applied by the driver may become a disturbance
to the automation. Moreover, when faced with an emergency
situation, drivers tend to hold the steering wheel straight and
fight any steering intervention [4], [18]. Such a driver reaction
can further subvert the automation’s efforts to prevent an
accident [5], [10].
Is it possible to choose a mechanical impedance for the
automation that would suppress driver disturbance yet retain
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a certain driver authority? Naturally, the human driver can
modulate their authority through muscle action and can always
attempt to overpower the automation [1], [19]. A tradeoff
appears to exist between collision avoidance provided by the
automation and fault tolerance provided by the driver. Setting
the automation impedance high might reduce the effect of
driver disturbance at the steering wheel but might also result
in an ‘authoritarian’ automation system against which the
driver has to compete for control (especially during automation
faults when the driver should have authority) [19], [20]. High
impedance automation may also risk injuring the driver’s
hands, especially when acting unexpectedly [10].
A small number of studies have analyzed driving perfor-
mance with high and low impedance automation systems and
coupled and decoupled steering wheels. However, studies on
the effect of high and low levels of automation impedance
are limited to lane keeping applications [19], [20]. On the
other hand, studies focused on automatic emergency steering
interventions are limited to investigations of the effects of
haptic and auditory warnings in driving with a decoupled steer-
ing wheel [5], [8]. Only one study on automatic emergency
steering interventions compared the performance of driving
with an intermittently decoupled steering wheel to driving
with a coupled steering wheel [4]. However, in this study, the
automation impedance in the coupled steering wheel case was
set so low that the driver disturbance resulted in a collision
with every obstacle placed on the test track.
In the present driving simulator study, we investigated the
effect of driver coupling and automation impedance on auto-
matic emergency steering interventions. We designed a decou-
pled steering scheme and two coupled steering schemes (one
with low and the other with high automation impedance), and
analyzed the human-automation team performance at avoiding
obstacles during emergency situations and automation faults.
For half of the participants, we simulated faults by making the
automation inactive near an obstacle and for the other half by
simulating a false automation activation. We also tested the
effect of the three coupling schemes on the time needed by
the driver to take back control from the automation system.
II. METHODS
A. Participants
Forty-eight participants (27 male, 21 female) participated
in this study. The participants were between 20 and 30 years
old (mean 23.5 years, SD = 3.6 years), had more than two
years of driving experience (mean 5.9 years, SD = 3.2 years),
and self-reported as having normal or corrected-to-normal
vision and normal hearing. All participants provided written
informed consent in accordance with a protocol approved by
the University of Michigan Institutional Review Board (ID:
HUM00164233). A complete experiment – including testing,
training, and survey – was two hours long. Each participant
was provided a financial compensation of $30 for completing
the experiment.
(a)
Pedestrian
(b)
(c)
(d)
Fig. 1: Experimental setup. (a) A subject performing the
test on the fixed-base driving simulator. (b) CarSim virtual
environment depicting the scenario in which a pedestrian
unexpectedly enters the road. (c) Top view of the driving
track (navigated clockwise) indicating the obstacle locations
and starting positions. (d) Virtual dashboard in the virtual
environment showing warnings and notifications.
B. Apparatus
The experimental apparatus was a custom fixed-base driving
simulator featuring a motorized steering wheel (Fig. 1a).
Details pertinent to the steering wheel design, automation
motor, encoders, and their assembly can be found in [3].
The virtual driving environment was displayed on three 24-
inch LCD widescreen monitors positioned about 140 cm from
the participant. The vehicle dynamics and control and the
virtual environment were implemented in CarSim (Mechanical
Simulation Corporation, Ann Arbor, MI) and Simulink (Math-
works, Natick MA) and were computed in real-time on a Dell
Precision 5820 Tower Workstation computer using an Intel
Xeon W-2125 Quad-Core processor. CarSim math models and
Simulink code were computed at 1000 Hz and the graphical
display was rendered at 50 Hz.
The virtual environment was created in CarSim VS Visual-
izer, and appeared as shown in Fig. 1b. It featured a D-Class
Sedan vehicle and a two-way road with various landmarks
and vehicles that provided motion cues during driving. The
vehicle traveled at a constant speed of 60 km/h using ‘Constant
Target Speed’ control in CarSim. Neither the participant nor
the automation system had any control over speed. The two-
way road was 8 m wide with 4 m wide lanes and a dashed
line separated traffic in two directions. The track width of the
vehicle was about 2.1 m. The entire track was 6 km long
and the obstacle locations and starting stations on the track
were randomized as shown in Fig. 1c. Visual notifications
and warnings were provided to the participants through a
virtual dashboard on the central monitor as shown in Fig. 1d.
Finally, audio alerts were provided to the participants through
a speaker located on the right side of the steering wheel. The
visual and audio alerts are further described in section II-E.
C. Automation System Design
We used a pure pursuit controller to develop an automation
system capable of lane keeping and obstacle avoidance. A pure
pursuit controller is essentially a proportional controller that
generates a steering angle to reduce the path tracking error of
a vehicle at a certain ‘look-ahead’ distance on the reference
path [21].
We first generated a path around the track and around
obstacles that served as a reference for the controller to
follow and ensured lane keeping and obstacle avoidance. A
look-ahead distance of 3 m was chosen for the controller.
Along with the generated reference path, the pure-pursuit
controller used the longitudinal and lateral coordinates of
the vehicle and the heading angle generated by the CarSim
vehicle model (integrated in real-time Simulink) to generate
the desired steering wheel angle that would achieve path
tracking. A controller commanded a torque signal to the motor
proportional to the difference between the actual and desired
steering wheel angle. Different proportional gains were used
for low and high impedance as further described below. The
difference between the commanded and actual angles was
felt by the driver as torque feedback at the steering wheel
and provided haptic cues for lane keeping and automation
behavior.
D. Coupling Schemes
The study employed a between-subject design with one
factor (coupling scheme) at three levels. The three coupling
schemes between the human driver and the automation system
were: Coupled Low Impedance, Coupled High Impedance, and
Decoupled with Feedback. All schemes had haptic feedback
during obstacle avoidance so that drivers could read and
understand the automation’s intentions.
In the Decoupled with Feedback scheme, participants had
no control over the vehicle trajectory (automation had full
control). Participants could, however, feel the automation
torque feedback on the steering wheel. The proportional gain
in Decoupled with Feedback scheme was 2.1. Drivers could
also move the steering wheel in Decoupled with Feedback
scheme; however, the driver’s steering input was ignored and
only the steering angle produced by the automation system
was passed to the CarSim model to maneuver the vehicle in
the virtual environment.
In the Coupled Low Impedance and Coupled High
Impedance schemes, drivers could influence the vehicle tra-
jectory by changing the steering angle. Participants could take
over control by increasing their grip and imposing a torque
on the steering wheel. Conversely, drivers could yield control
to the automation system by relaxing their grip (reducing arm
backdrive impedance) on the steering wheel. In the Coupled
Low Impedance case, the proportional gain used to determine
the automation torque feedback was lower and hence the haptic
feedback was weaker than the Coupled High Impedance case.
The proportional gain in the Coupled Low Impedance scheme
was 2.1 whereas the proportional gain in the Coupled High
Impedance scheme was 4.2. As a result, it was also easier
to take over control and fight the automation system in the
Coupled Low Impedance case than it was in the Coupled High
Impedance case. Also note that since the proportional gains
used in Coupled Low Impedance and Decoupled with Feed-
back schemes were the same, the torque feedback experienced
in the two schemes was similar.
E. Experiment Procedure
The forty-eight participants recruited to the study were
randomly divided into three groups (Coupled Low Impedance
(CLI), Coupled High Impedance (CHI), and Decoupled with
Feedback (DwF)) of 16 participants each (9 males, 7 females).
The driving task was to keep the vehicle centered in the
right lane of the two-way road and avoid any obstacles that
appeared in the lane. To help the driver with lane centering,
a lane departure warning appeared on the virtual dashboard
(Fig. 1d) when the deviation of the vehicle from the center
of the right lane exceeded 0.6 m (the lane was 4 m wide).
Obstacles in the form of pedestrians, deer, or other vehicles
unexpectedly entered the road from the right side of the driving
lane (Fig. 1b) and stopped at the center of the lane. Time
available to avoid the obstacles was about one second. As soon
as the obstacle stopped, the automation system performed an
emergency steering intervention towards the left to help the
driver avoid the obstacle. During the steering intervention, the
lane departure warning disappeared and an ‘AUTOMATION
IS ON’ notification appeared on the virtual dashboard to
indicate that the automation system was active. After avoiding
the obstacle, the automation system returned the vehicle back
to the center of the right lane at which point a take-over-request
(TOR) notification ‘TAKE OVER CONTROL’ appeared on
(a) Intended Automation
(b) Idle Automation
(c) Adversarial Automation
Fig. 2: Three types of automation behaviors designed and
tested in the experiment.
the virtual dashboard. Four seconds after the first appearance
of the TOR, monotone auditory alerts generating one “beep”
every two seconds were sent from a speaker to remind the
driver to take over. The notifications and the auditory alert
turned off as soon as the driver pressed the red button, took
back control, and resumed manual driving.
Each participant was first given instructions on the screen
explaining the driving task, the virtual environment, the virtual
dashboard, and the coupling scheme that they were assigned.
Participants were asked to drive as close as possible to the
center of the right lane and look for the lane departure warning.
This instruction was given to ensure that all the participants
were at the center of their lanes when an obstacle appeared
in their lane. Participants were told that the obstacles would
appear suddenly and that the automation would always turn
on and help them avoid the obstacle. Participants were also
advised to keep their hands on the steering wheel when the
automation performed an obstacle avoidance maneuver.
Next, participants completed two 6-minute training trials
with one obstacle in each trial and ten formal trials with eight
obstacles in total that were avoided by the automation system.
There was a minute-long break between trials. The first nine
of the formal trials were randomized. Out of these nine trials,
three trials had no obstacles, four trials had one obstacle each,
and two trials had two obstacles each. Moreover, trials were
designed to have different surroundings (weather and time
of day varied between trials) and random start positions and
obstacle locations. These measures were taken to discourage
any learning and adaptation effects.
The eight obstacles in the first nine formal trials were all
avoided by the automation which worked as intended (see
Fig. 2a). This resulted in a total of 128 intended automa-
tion obstacles for each of the three groups. The last trial
always involved an unexpected automation failure, either idle
automation (automation failed to activate in the presence of
an obstacle) or adversarial automation (automation initiated
maneuver into oncoming traffic in the absence of an obstacle),
as shown in Fig. 2b and Fig. 2c. Half of the participants in each
coupling scheme experienced idle automation in their last trial
and the other half experienced adversarial automation. This
resulted in a total of eight idle automation obstacles and eight
adversarial automation obstacles in each group. At the end of
the experiment, participants were asked to fill out a debriefing
questionnaire that was used to gather participant feedback on
the three automation schemes.
F. Performance Metrics and Data Analysis
There were four dependent measures in this study: (1)
Obstacle Hits, (2) Peak Excursion, (3) Excursion Time, and (4)
Take-over Time. The first metric, Obstacle Hits, was defined
as the total number of collisions with obstacles and was
analyzed separately for intended automation, idle automation,
and adversarial automation. The remaining three metrics were
analyzed only for the intended automation condition. Peak
Excursion was measured as the absolute maximum lateral
deviation of the vehicle away from the center of the right lane
while avoiding the obstacle (as shown in Fig. 3). Excursion
Time was defined as the time between the instant the vehicle
first departed the lane to avoid the obstacle and the instant
the vehicle came back to the center of the right lane. Finally,
Take-over Time was the time taken by the driver to press the
red button to turn the automation off after the TOR appeared
for the first time on the screen.
Obstacle
Vehicle
Trajectory
Peak
Excursion
Lane
Centerline
Take-over
Request
Appears
Button
Pressed
(Automation
turns off)
Automation
turns on
a
b
c
Fig. 3: A sample trajectory around the obstacle. The automa-
tion turned on at point a which was located 17 m (about 1
second) before the obstacle. A take-over-request appeared on
the screen at point b when the automation brought the vehicle
back to the center of the right lane. The automation turned off
at point c when the subject pressed the red button. Maximum
deviation from the center of the right lane was defined as the
Peak Excursion. The time taken by the vehicle to travel from
a to b was defined as the Excursion Time, and the time taken
to travel from b to c was defined as the Take-over Time.
Obstacle Hits were analyzed using binary logistic regres-
sion. All other metrics were analyzed using linear mixed
models with coupling scheme as a fixed factor and subject ID
as a random factor. The significance level was set at p < 0.05.
Post-hoc Bonferroni tests were conducted to perform pairwise
comparisons between the three coupling schemes.
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Fig. 4: Driving trajectories around obstacles for all 48 participants, separated by coupling scheme and automation behavior.
Obstacles are depicted to scale by grey ellipses in each plot. Intersection of trajectories with the obstacles indicate obstacle
hits. (Note that the obstacle in adversarial automation case had a different size as shown in Fig. 2.)
III. RESULTS
Differences between the three coupling schemes were ap-
parent in the obstacle hits and excursion metrics. Fig. 4
shows the driving trajectories taken around the obstacles by all
participants in each coupling scheme. The obstacles are shown
by grey ellipses and any intersection of the trajectories with
the ellipse denotes an obstacle hit. More intended automation
obstacles were hit in the Coupled Low Impedance group
than in the Coupled High Impedance and the Decoupled
with Feedback groups. In contrast, fewer idle and adversarial
automation obstacles were hit in the Coupled Low Impedance
group, compared to the other two groups. For the intended
automation obstacles, Coupled High Impedance resulted in
large excursions around the obstacles whereas the Decoupled
with Feedback scheme resulted in the smallest excursions.
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Fig. 5: Percent obstacle hits for three types of obstacles
separated by coupling scheme. Numbers on the top of the
bars indicate total number of hits out of 128 obstacles for the
intended automation case, and out of 8 obstacles for the idle
automation and the adversarial automation cases.
1) Intended Automation: Out of the 128 intended automa-
tion obstacles, the Decoupled with Feedback group had no ob-
stacle collisions (Fig. 5). On the other hand, the Coupled High
Impedance group had six and the Coupled Low Impedance
group had 29 collisions.
Analysis on the Obstacle Hits metric indicated a main effect
of coupling scheme (F (2, 381) = 4.791, p = 0.009). Post-hoc
comparisons further revealed that the likelihood of a hit for the
Coupled Low Impedance group was significantly higher than
for both the Coupled High Impedance group (p = 0.006) and
the Decoupled with Feedback group (p < 0.001). Moreover,
likelihood of a hit in the Coupled High Impedance group was
significantly higher than the Decoupled with Feedback group
(p = 0.033).
2) Idle Automation: In the Idle Automation case, the Cou-
pled Low Impedance group had only two hits out of eight
obstacles. Six out of eight obstacles were hit in the Decoupled
with Feedback scheme, while four out of eight obstacles were
hit in the Coupled High Impedance group (Fig. 5). However,
the effect of coupling scheme on hits was not found to be
significant (p = 0.147).
3) Adversarial Automation: Out of eight adversarial au-
tomation obstacles, Coupled High Impedance group had seven
obstacle hits and Decoupled with Feedback group had eight
obstacle hits. On the other hand, Coupled Low Impedance
group had only three hits (see Fig. 5). There was a significant
effect of coupling scheme in the adversarial automation case
(F (2, 21) = 6.682, p = 0.006). Post-hoc Bonferroni tests
revealed that the likelihood of a hit for the Coupled Low
Impedance group was significantly lower than for the Decou-
pled with Feedback group (p = 0.007) and the Coupled High
Impedance group (p = 0.035). No significant differences were
found between the Decoupled with Feedback and the Coupled
High Impedance groups.
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Fig. 6: (a) Mean Peak Excursion and (b) Mean Excursion Time
for the three coupling schemes. Error bars are ± 1 standard
error of mean.
Peak Excursion was used to gauge which coupling scheme
produced the largest deviations from the center of the right
lane. Peak Excursion differed significantly between the three
coupling schemes (F (2, 346) = 4.413, p = 0.013) (see Fig.
6a). Post-hoc Bonferroni tests revealed that the Decoupled
with Feedback group had a significantly lower mean Peak
Excursion than both the Coupled High Impedance group (3.70
m vs. 4.12 m, p = 0.025) and the Coupled Low Impedance
group (3.70 m vs. 4.08 m, p = 0.029). No other significant
differences were found.
C. Excursion Time
Excursion Time indicated how much time was spent
away from the lane center during obstacle avoidance. There
was a main effect of coupling scheme for Excursion Time
(F (2, 346) = 4.413, p = 0.003) (see Fig. 6b). Post-hoc
Bonferroni tests showed that the Coupled High Impedance
scheme had significantly lower mean Excursion Time than
both the Decoupled with Feedback scheme (3.07 s vs. 3.33
s, p = 0.005) and the Coupled Low Impedance scheme (3.07
s vs. 3.32 s, p = 0.01). No other significant differences were
found.
D. Take-over Time
Take-over Time was used to measure which coupling
scheme encouraged faster automation-to-driver transitions.
There were no significant differences between the mean Take-
over Time for the three groups (p = 0.348).
IV. DISCUSSION
In this driving simulator study, we compared the obstacle
avoidance performance for three different automatic steering
intervention schemes which differed in the amount of control
authority provided to the automation system. In the Decoupled
with Feedback scheme, the driver and the steering wheel were
decoupled from the tires, and automation had full control over
the vehicle. In the Coupled High Impedance and Coupled Low
Impedance schemes, the steering wheel was coupled to the
tires, and the automation system was provided high control
authority or low control authority, respectively. When working
properly, the automation helped the driver avoid an obstacle
that appeared unexpectedly on the road (intended automation).
One of two types of automation failure was simulated during
the last trial: the automation would either fail to activate when
an obstacle appeared (idle automation) or it would initiate a
maneuver into oncoming traffic in the absence of an obstacle
(adversarial automation).
The likelihood of a collision when the automation worked
properly was significantly lower in the Coupled High
Impedance group than in the Coupled Low Impedance group.
This finding suggests that a high impedance automation sys-
tem has the potential to improve safety and performance by
reducing the influence of driver disturbance during emergency
situations as hypothesized in [4], [5]. However, the Coupled
High Impedance group still had a significantly higher likeli-
hood of a collision than the Decoupled with Feedback group
implying that allowing even a minor driver disturbance at the
steering wheel imposes some risk of collision.
It is important to note, however, that a different picture
emerges in the case of automation faults. Here, the likelihood
of a collision did not differ significantly between the Coupled
High Impedance and the Decoupled with Feedback groups.
This suggests that during automation faults a high impedance
automation might behave similar to an automation system
in which the driver is decoupled from the tires. Especially
when the automation initiated a maneuver in the absence
of an obstacle (adversarial automation), participants in the
Coupled High Impedance group reported that they recognized
the automation failure but found it difficult to override the
automation in a timely fashion to prevent the collision. This
may be the result of startle and confusion on the part of the
driver who, despite being aware of the option to override
the automation, was not able to exert control quickly and
decisively. In the presence of an obstacle, a driver is likely
to monitor the automation to ensure that it takes action. This
mental readiness allows for faster and effective intervention. In
contrast, in the absence of an obstacle, the driver experiences
a fundamental surprise, resulting in a longer response time.
A longer response time in combination with larger muscular
effort required to overpower a high impedance automation
significantly increases the chances of a collision. On the
other hand, the likelihood of a collision in the Coupled Low
Impedance group was significantly lower than for the other
two coupling schemes. The Coupled Low Impedance scheme
enables the driver to ‘edit’ automation control inputs fairly
quickly and easily when necessary. These results are consistent
with the lumberjack analogy [22]; When automation worked
properly, the increased degree of automation could improve
performance, but in the failure conditions, higher levels of
automation lead to more significantly impaired performance.
In the idle automation case, we had expected that the Decou-
pled with Feedback group would promote driver complacency
and over-reliance on the automation’s action ([2], [15]), and
would therefore result in significantly more hits than the Cou-
pled High Impedance and Coupled Low Impedance groups.
The participants in the Decoupled with Feedback group did
report that they relied on automation to avoid the obstacle
and either did not react or reacted very late to the automation
dropout (which is also evident from the trajectories shown
in Fig. 4). However, no statistically significant differences
in the number of hits were seen between the three coupling
conditions in the idle automation case.
The excursions around the obstacles also reveal some im-
portant differences in driver behavior for the three coupling
schemes. Not surprisingly, the excursions were significantly
larger in the coupled driving schemes, compared to the decou-
pled scheme. This can be attributed to the added driver input in
the coupled driving schemes. Importantly, in the Coupled High
Impedance scheme, a few trajectories exhibited overshoots
beyond the edge of the road (see Fig. 4). Consistent with
the findings in [19] and [20], some participants in the Cou-
pled High Impedance group reported that the transition from
manual to automated driving was sudden and discomforting,
and that the automation acted too strongly and aggressively.
As a result, the participants may have initially fought the
automation but after seeing the obstacle, they relinquished
control to automation which then resulted in the overshoots.
The excursions in the Coupled High Impedance group
were significantly shorter than in the other two groups. One
possible explanation for this finding is that participants were
uncomfortable with the rather powerful automation that they
found difficult to override, and therefore wanted to return to
the center of the right lane as soon as possible to take back
control of the vehicle. Finally, we expected that participants
would take longer to take back control from automation in
the Decoupled with Feedback group because of being out-
of-the-loop with a decoupled steering wheel during obstacle
avoidance [10], [15]. However, the differences in Take-over
Time between the groups were insignificant.
In summary, the results of this study highlight a trade-off
in automation design: high impedance automation can signif-
icantly reduce unwarranted driver input on the steering wheel
during emergency situations but may cause driver discomfort
and may be too strong to override during automation faults.
This result is consistent with the hypotheses and findings
presented in the past [5], [10], [17], [19], [20], [22]. Con-
trary to expectations, decoupling the driver during emergency
interventions did not significantly increase the time required
for driver to resume control or the number of collisions during
automation dropouts. To combine the advantages of low and
high impedance automation, an adaptive impedance system
could be designed that would assume a high level of authority
during emergency situations in which the automation has high
confidence, and low level of authority during situations in
which the automation has low confidence to give override
power to the human [1], [23], [24]. The design challenge for
such an automation system would be to modulate automation
impedance as a function of driver intention, sensor precision,
and environmental complexity.
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